G.R. No. 165676 : November 22, 2010 JOSE MENDOZA, * Petitioner, v. NARCISO GERMINO and BENIGNO GERMINO, Respondents. : November 2010 (2024)

November 2010 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions

THIRDDIVISION

G.R.No. 165676 : November 22, 2010

JOSE MENDOZA, * Petitioner, v. NARCISO GERMINO and BENIGNO GERMINO, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

BRION, J.:

Before usis the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Jose Mendoza to challenge the decision2 and the resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) inCA-G.R. SP No. 48642.4

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The factsof the case, gathered from the records, are briefly summarized below.

On June 27,1988, the petitioner and Aurora C. Mendoza5 (plaintiffs) filed a complaint with theMunicipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sta.Rosa, Nueva Ecija against respondent Narciso Germino for forcible entry.6

Theplaintiffs claimed that they were the registered owners of a five-hectareparcel of land in Soledad, Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija (subject property) under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34267. Sometime in 1988, respondent Narciso unlawfullyentered the subject property by means of strategy and stealth, and without theirknowledge or consent. Despite theplaintiffs' repeated demands, respondent Narciso refused to vacate the subjectproperty.7

On August9, 1988, respondent Narciso filed his answer, claiming, among others, that hisbrother, respondent Benigno Germino, was the plaintiffs' agricultural lesseeand he merely helped the latter in the cultivation as a member of the immediatefarm household.8

Afterseveral postponements, the plaintiffs filed a motion to remand the case to theDepartment of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), in view of the tenancy issue raised by respondent Narciso.

Without conductinga hearing, and despite respondent Narciso's objection, the MTC issued an orderon October 27, 1995, remanding the case to the DARAB, Cabanatuan City forfurther proceedings.9

On December14, 1995, the plaintiffs10 filed an amended complaint with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD), impleading respondent Benigno asadditional defendant.

Theplaintiffs alleged that Efren Bernardo was the agricultural lessee of thesubject property. Respondent Benigno unlawfullyentered the subject property in 1982 or 1983 through strategy and stealth, andwithout their knowledge or consent. He withheldpossession of the subject property up to 1987, and appropriated for himself itsproduce, despite repeated demands from the plaintiffs for the return of theproperty. In 1987, they discovered that respondentBenigno had transferred possession of the subject property to respondentNarciso, who refused to return the possession of the subject property to theplaintiffs and appropriated the land's produce for himself. The subject property was fully irrigated andwas capable of harvest for 2 cropping seasons. Since the subject property could produce 100 cavans of palay per hectarefor each cropping season, or a total of 500 cavans per cropping season for thefive-hectare land, the plaintiffs alleged that the respondents were able toharvest a total of 13,000 cavans of palay from the time they unlawfullywithheld possession of the subject property in 1982 until the plaintiffs filedthe complaint. Thus, they prayed thatthe respondents be ordered to jointly and severally pay 13,000 cavans of palay,or its monetary equivalent, as actual damages, to return possession of thesubject property, and to pay P15,000.00 as attorney's fees.11

On January9, 1996, the respondents filed their answer denying the allegations in thecomplaint, claiming, among others, that the plaintiffs had no right over thesubject property as they agreed to sell it to respondent Benigno for P87,000.00. As a matter of fact, respondent Benigno hadalready made a P50,000.00 partial payment, but the plaintiffs refused toreceive the balance and execute the deed of conveyance, despite repeated demands. The respondents also asserted that jurisdictionover the complaint lies with the Regional Trial Court since ownership andpossession are the issues.12

THE PARAD RULING

In a March19, 1996 decision, PARAD Romeo Bello found that the respondents were mereusurpers of the subject property, noting that they failed to prove thatrespondent Benigno was the plaintiffs' bonafide agricultural lessee. The PARAD ordered the respondents to vacate thesubject property, and pay the plaintiffs 500 cavans of palay as actual damages.13

Notsatisfied, the respondents filed a notice of appeal with the DARAB, arguing thatthe case should have been dismissed because the MTC's referral to the DARAB wasvoid with the enactment of Republic Act (R.A.)No. 6657,14 which repealed the rule on referral under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 316.15

THE DARAB RULING

The DARABdecided the appeal on July 22, 1998. Itheld that it acquired jurisdiction because of the amended complaint thatsufficiently alleged an agrarian dispute, not the MTC's referral of the case.Thus, it affirmed the PARAD decision.16

The respondentselevated the case to the CA via a petition for review under Rule 43 of theRules of Court.17

THE CA RULING

The CAdecided the appeal on October 6, 2003.18 Itfound that the MTC erred in transferring the case to the DARAB since thematerial allegations of the complaint and the relief sought show a case forforcible entry, not an agrarian dispute. It noted that the subsequent filing ofthe amended complaint did not confer jurisdiction upon the DARAB.Thus,the CA set aside the DARAB decision and remanded the case to the MTC forfurther proceedings.

When the CAdenied19 the subsequent motion for reconsideration,20 thepetitioner filed the present petition.21

THE PETITION

Thepetitioner insists that the jurisdiction lies with the DARAB since the natureof the action and the allegations of the complaint show an agrarian dispute.

THE CASE FOR THE RESPONDENTS

Therespondents submit that R.A. No. 6657 abrogated the rule on referral previouslyprovided in P.D. No. 316. Moreover,neither the Rules of Court nor the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure (RRSP) provides that forcible entry casescan be referred to the DARAB.

THE ISSUE

The coreissue is whether the MTC or the DARAB has jurisdiction over the case.

OUR RULING

We deny thepetition.

Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint

It is a basicrule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegationsin the complaint.22 It is determined exclusively by the Constitution and the law. It cannot beconferred by the voluntary act or agreement of the parties, or acquired throughor waived, enlarged or diminished by their act or omission, nor conferred bythe acquiescence of the court. Well to emphasize, it is neither for the courtnor the parties to violate or disregard the rule, this matter being legislativein character.23

Under BatasPambansa Blg. 129,24 as amended by R.A. No. 7691,25 the MTC shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entryand unlawful detainer. The RRSP26 governs the remedial aspects of these suits.27

UnderSection 5028 of R.A. No. 6657, as well as Section 3429 ofExecutive Order No. 129-A,30 the DARAB has primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and appellate,to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the implementationof the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, and other agrarian laws and theirimplementing rules and regulations.

An agrariandispute refers to any controversy relating to, among others, tenancy over landsdevoted to agriculture.31 For a case to involve an agrarian dispute, the following essential requisitesof an agricultural tenancy relationship must be present: (1) the parties arethe landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) thereis consent; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personalcultivation; and (6) there is sharing of harvest or payment of rental.32

In thepresent case, the petitioner, as one of the plaintiffs in the MTC, made thefollowing allegations and prayer in the complaint:clubjuris

3. Plaintiffs are the registered owners of a parcel of land covered by and described in Transfer Certificate of Title Numbered 34267, with an area of five (5) hectares, more or less situated at Bo. Soledad, Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija. x x x;clubjuris

4. That so defendant thru stealth, strategy and without the knowledge, or consent of administrator x x x much more of the herein plaintiffs, unlawfully entered and occupied said parcel of land;clubjuris

5. Inspite of x x x demands, defendant Germino, refused and up to the filing of this complaint, still refused to vacate the same;clubjuris

6. The continuos (sic) and unabated occupancy of the land by the defendant would work and cause prejudice and irreparable damage and injury to the plaintiffs unless a writ of preliminary injunction is issued;clubjuris

7. This prejudice, damage or injury consist of disturbance of property rights tantamount to deprivation of ownership or any of its attributes without due process of law, a diminution of plaintiffs' property rights or dominion over the parcel of land subject of this dispute, since they are deprived of freely entering or possessing the same;clubjuris

8. The plaintiffs are entitled to the relief demanded or prayed for, and the whole or part of such relief/s consist of immediately or permanently RESTRAINING, ENJOINING or STOPPING the defendant or any person/s acting in his behalf, from entering, occupying, or in any manner committing, performing or suffering to be committed or performed for him, any act indicative of, or tending to show any color of possession in or about the tenement, premises or subject of this suit, such as described in par. 3 of this complaint;clubjuris

9. Plaintiffs are ready and willing to post a bond answerable to any damage/s should the issuance of the writ x x x;clubjuris

10. As a consequence of defendant's malevolent refusal to vacate the premises of the land in dispute, plaintiffs incurred litigation expenses of P1,500.00, availing for the purpose the assistance of a counsel at an agreed honorarium of P5,000.00 and P250.00 per appearance/ not to mention the moral damages incurred due to sleepless nights and mental anxiety, including exemplary damages, the award and amount of which are left to the sound discretion of this Honorable Court.

P R A Y E R

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that pending the resolution of the issue in this case, a restraining order be issued RESTRAINING, ENJOINING, or STOPPING the defendant or any person/s acting in his behalf, from ENTERING OR OCCUPYING the parcel of land, or any portion thereof, described in paragraph 3 of this complaint, nor in any manner committing, performing or suffering to be committed or, performed for him, by himself or thru another, any act indicative of, or tending to show any color of possession in or about the premises subject of this suit;clubjuris

THEREAFTER, making said writ of preliminary injunction PERMANENT; and on plaintiffs' damages, judgment be rendered ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiffs the sum alleged in paragraph 10 above.

GENERAL RELIEFS ARE LIKEWISE PRAYED FOR.33

Based onthese allegations and reliefs prayed, it is clear that the action in the MTCwas for forcible entry.

Allegation of tenancy does not divest the MTC of jurisdiction

Although respondentNarciso averred tenancy as an affirmative and/or special defense in his answer,this did not automatically divest the MTC of jurisdiction over the complaint. Itcontinued to have the authority to hear the case precisely to determine whetherit had jurisdiction to dispose of the ejectment suit on its merits.34 After all, jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up bythe defendant in an answer or a motion to dismiss. Otherwise, jurisdictionwould become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of the defendant.35

Under the RRSP,the MTC is duty-bound to conduct a preliminary conference36 and, ifnecessary, to receive evidence to determine if such tenancy relationship had,in fact, been shown to be the real issue.37 The MTCmay even opt to conduct a hearing on the special and affirmative defense of thedefendant, although under the RRSP, such a hearing is not a matter of right.38 If it is shown during the hearing or conference that, indeed, tenancy is theissue, the MTC should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.39

In thepresent case, instead of conducting a preliminary conference, the MTCimmediately referred the case to the DARAB. This was contrary to the rules. Besides, Section 240 of P.D.No. 316, which required the referral of a land dispute case to the Departmentof Agrarian Reform for the preliminary determination of the existence of an agriculturaltenancy relationship, has indeed been repealed by Section 7641 of R.A. No. 6657 in 1988.

Amended complaint did confer jurisdiction on the DARAB

Neither didthe amendment of the complaint confer jurisdiction on the DARAB. The plaintiffs alleged in the amendedcomplaint that the subject property was previously tilled by Efren Bernardo,and the respondents took possession by strategy and stealth, without theirknowledge and consent. In the absence of any allegation of a tenancyrelationship between the parties, the action was for recovery of possession ofreal property that was within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.42

The CA,therefore, committed no reversible error in setting aside the DARAB decision. Whilewe lament the lapse of time this forcible entry case has been pendingresolution, we are not in a position to resolve the dispute between the partiessince the evidence required in courts is different from that of administrativeagencies.43

WHEREFORE, thepetition is DENIED. The October 6, 2003 Decision and October 12, 2004 Resolutionof the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 48642 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SOORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WECONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the aboveDecision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to thewriter of the opinion of the Court's Division.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant toSection 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson'sAttestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before thecase was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

RENATOC. CORONA
Chief Justice

* Known as 'Jose C. Mendoza, Jr.' in other parts of the record.

** Designated additional Member vice Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, per Raffle dated Nov. 15, 2010.

1 Filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; rollo, pp. 25-48.

2 Dated October 6, 2003; penned by Associate Justice Godardo A. Jacinto, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Elvi John S. Asuncion and Lucas P. Bersamin (now a member of this Court); id. at 50-59.

3 Dated October 12, 2004; id. at 61-62.

4 Entitled 'Narciso Germino and Benigno Germino v. Jose Mendoza and Aurora Mendoza, rep. by their Attorney-In-Fact, Dolores Mendoza.'

5 Through their attorney-in-fact, Otelia Mendoza.

6 Rollo, pp. 73-74.

7 Ibid.

8 Id. at 75-79.

9 Id. at 80.

10 Through their attorney-in-fact, Dolores Mendoza.

11 Rollo, pp. 81-85.

12 Id. at 86-90.

13 Id. at 91-99.

14 Otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. The Act was signed by then President Corazon C. Aquino on June 10, 1988 and took effect on June 15, 1988.

15 Prohibiting the Ejectment of Tenant-Tillers from their Farmholdings Pending the Promulgation of the Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree No. 27.

16 Rollo, pp. 100-109.

17 Id. at 110-125.

18 Supra note 2.

19 Supra note 3.

20 Rollo, pp. 63-72.

21 Id. at 25-48.

22 Morta, Sr. v. Occidental, G.R. No. 123417, June 10, 1999, 308 SCRA 167.

23 OCA v. Court of Appeals, 428 Phil. 696 (2002).

24 The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, approved on August 14, 1981.

25 An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Amending For The Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, Otherwise Known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980," approved on March 25, 1994.

26 Took effect on November 15, 1991.

27 Rivera v. Santiago, G.R. No. 146501, August 28, 2003, 410 SCRA 113, 120.

28 Sec. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. ' The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

29 Sec. 34. Implementing Authority of the Secretary. ' The Secretary shall issue orders, rules and regulations and other issuances as may be necessary to ensure the effective implementation of the provisions of this Executive Order.

30 Modifying Executive Order No. 129 Reorganizing and Strengthening the Department of Agrarian Reform and for Other Purposes.

31 Isidro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105586, December 15, 1993, 228 SCRA 503, 510.

32 Pascual v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138781, December 3, 2001, 371 SCRA 338, 346.

33 Rollo, pp. 73-74.

34 Isidro v. Court of Appeals, supra note 31, at 509.

35 Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. v. Judge, Regional Trial Court, Davao City, Br. 8, G.R. No. 147058, March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA 272; Lacson Hermanas, Inc. v. Heirs of Ignacio, G.R. No. 165973, June 29, 2005, 462 SCRA 290; Sta. Clara Homeowners' Association v. Gaston, 425 Phil. 221, 237-238 (2002).

37 Ualat v. Ramos, A.M. Nos. MTJ-91-567 & MTJ-91-588, December 6, 1996, 265 SCRA 345, 357.

38 Rivera v. Santiago, G.R. No. 146501, August 28, 2003, 410 SCRA 113.

39 Hilado v. Chavez, G.R. No. 134742, September 22, 2004, 438 SCRA 623.

40 Sec. 2. Unless certified by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform as a proper case for trial or hearing by a court or judge or other officer of competent jurisdiction, no judge of the Court of Agrarian Relations, Court of First Instance, municipal or city court, or any other tribunal or fiscal shall take cognizance of any ejectment case or any other case designed to harass or remove a tenant of an agricultural land primarily devoted to rice and corn, and if any such cases are filed, these cases shall first be referred to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform or his authorized representative in the locality for a preliminary determination of the relationship between the contending parties. If the Secretary of Agrarian Reform finds that the case is a proper case for the court or judge or other hearing officer to hear, he shall so certify and such court, judge or other hearing officer may assume jurisdiction over the dispute or controversy.

41 Sec. 76. Repealing Clause. ' Section 35 of Republic Act No. 3844, Presidential Decree No. 316, the last two paragraphs of Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 946, Presidential Decree No. 1038, and all other laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, issuances or parts thereof inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.

42 Arzaga v. Copias, G.R. No. 152404, March 28, 2003, 400 SCRA 148.

43 Caraan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124516, April 24, 1998, 289 SCRA 579, 584.